28th January 2007
Israel and Europe have more to fear from
an Iranian missile converted to launch a spy satellite
than the satellite itself
Iran is closer than ever before to the
launch of a spy satellite by a BM25 ballistic missile,
18 of which were purchased from North Korea,
notwithstanding Pyongyang’s denials of aid to Iran’s
nuclear program. Allaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the
Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign
policy commission, said last week that Iran had finished
building a reconnaissance satellite and converted a
ballistic missile into a space launcher. If this claim
is correct, then Iran has a launcher able to put 300 kg
into earth orbit - and by the same definition, an ICBM
that could drop more than 300 kg anywhere in the world,
including Washington DC.
While
the new Shehab 3ER can strike any part of the Middle
East as far west as Turkey, according to the former head
of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, Uzi Rubin,
the BM25s with a range of up to 4,000 km can reach
targets in Europe. Little is known about this missile.
However, its conversion to a space launcher would
produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
able to drop a payload weighing 300 km, the estimated
weight of a reconnaissance satellite, anywhere in the
world.
DEBKAfile’s
military sources report that Iran has just finished
upgrading its Shehab series, adapting them to solid
fuel.
Although most military and intelligence
experts doubt the Iranian satellite would survive in
orbit for more than a few months before burning out,
Tehran’s technological feats cannot be overstated. Its
initial goal appears to be deterrence at a time that the
United States is massing heavy naval, air and amphibious
might opposite Iranian shores. However, the Islamic
Republic’s progress in missile development is as much or
more cause for concern than the announcement Jan. 27 by
a senior Majlis lawmaker that Tehran has begun
installing 3,000 nuclear centrifuges ahead of schedule
at the Natanz underground facility.
Our intelligence sources reveal this
group of centrifuges is being activated in stages, an
added 200-300 every ten days. So far, between 1,000 and
1,200 are believed to be operational and all 3,000 are
expected to be working by the end of April.
The Islamic Republic’s nuclear-missile
infrastructure rests further on the reported purchase of
a dozen Kh 55 nuclear-capable cruise missiles on the
Ukraine’s nuclear black market some time ago. They were
apparently sold stripped of the components making them
functional, including their original 200-kiloton
warheads, but may have come with manuals. Some experts
in the West and Russia believe Iranian missile engineers
were able to dismantle and replicate some of the Kh 55
systems and implant them in their home-assembled
missiles.
Whereas Israel has only a single
awkwardly-angled route for inserting its Ofek satellites
into orbit, the Mediterranean, Iran can use two routes -
northward above the Caspian Sea or southward over the
Indian Ocean to avoid the risk of any of its stages
falling on Russian or Saudi soil in a failed launch.
Washington has been impelled by Tehran’s
rapid progress in missile technology and uranium
enrichment to make haste and get elements of its
anti-ballistic missile system quickly based in Poland
and the Czech Republic, ready to intercept any
prospective Iranian missiles heading towards Europe.
Moscow objects strongly to US missiles
being based in the two former Warsaw Pact countries.
Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov argued this week
that Iran does not and will not possess missiles posing
this threat. The American missiles, he charged, are
pointed at Moscow rather than Tehran.
The fundamental conflict of interests on
Iran between Russia and the United States stands out a
mile.
Moscow, up in arms to protect its stake
in Iran’s nuclear program, has refused to take Tehran’s
belligerent stance as seriously as Washington and
consistently soft-pedals international punitive action
against its violations, such as uranium enrichment.
The United States, for its part, is
perturbed enough by the Iran’s developing missile and
nuclear capabilities to resort to defensive tactics to
protect itself and its allies in Europe and the Middle
East.
As for Israel, the launch of an Iranian
spy satellite would not be the worst-case scenario; if
successful, the damage it posed would depend on the
optical quality of its camera lenses.
The real trouble is inherent in the
ICBM-cum-launcher.
A three stage-missile in Iranian hands,
powered by solid fuel with a long-range capability
presents a major military challenge to Israel and the
IDF. Israel would defend itself with its anti-missile
missile Arrow system, as well as surface missiles, which
can reach Iranian targets and offer a deterrent to
counterbalance its missiles. But the size and
capabilities of the missiles in which Iran is investing
underscore Israel’s inadequacies.
Furthermore, Iran has the great advantage
of an area which dwarfs Israel and the strength of
numbers and resources. The Islamic Republic today is far
from matching its description by Israeli ministers
Shimon Peres and Rafi Eytan as weak, fragmented and
potentially short-lived.
If Israel so decides, its missiles can
indeed home in on focal strategic points in Iran and
cause substantial damage. But they are not up to
disabling the Islamic Republic or radically upsetting
its strategic equilibrium. The Arrow defensive system
could knock out of the sky one or more of the new Shehab
3ER missiles; it cannot handle the complexities of a
multiple Shehab warhead fired to deflect Arrow
interceptors from meeting a heavyweight incoming BM25
ICBM.
The only effective resource Israel has at
this point is the power of a pre-emptive strike against
Iran’s range of sophisticated missiles, a goal no less
important than its nuclear installations.
Like Peres and Eytan, Israeli prime
minister Ehud Olmert was talking through his hat last
week when he denied any “direct Iranian nuclear threat
to Israel” He was offering cold comfort at best,
blinding himself to the realities, at worst.
Compliments to
Debka.com
