28th February 2007
The
evidence of al-Qaeda's interest in conducting a
terrorist attack with chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons appears
compelling. As early as 1998, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden declared the acquisition of CBRN weapons a
"religious duty" for Muslims [1]. He followed up in 2003
by asking for and receiving a fatwa from Saudi Sheikh
Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd that condoned the use of CBRN
weapons by Muslims against infidels [2]. Combined with
the multitude of warnings from al-Qaeda associates that
a CBRN attack against the West is not only forthcoming
but also long overdue, the Muslim "duty to warn" has
been firmly established. In al-Qaeda's opinion, no
further justification is needed and no additional
warnings are required [3]. These words have also been
backed up by deeds. In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda began
its efforts to acquire radiological and nuclear
materials [4]. While no evidence exists that these
efforts have succeeded, there is little doubt that
al-Qaeda continues to pursue this capability today.
Prior to the fall of the Taliban, the training camps in
Afghanistan taught recipes for the manufacturing of
poisons and toxins including cyanide and botulinum. A
video recovered by CNN in Afghanistan in 2002 clearly
demonstrates that al-Qaeda had some success in
manufacturing chemical weapons in the form of a
poisonous gas capable of causing death. The WMD
Commission reported that al-Qaeda had similar success
with biological weapons, including the acquisition of at
least small quantities of the virulent strain of "Agent
X" which has been widely reported to be anthrax [5].
While some technical hurdles remain for al-Qaeda to
weaponize and effectively employ CBRN weapons on a
mass-casualty scale, the terrorist group clearly is
capable of conducting small-scale, low-tech CBRN
attacks.
Given
this stated desire and apparent capability to conduct a
CBRN terrorist attack, why has al-Qaeda not yet launched
an attack with such weapons? This analysis explores
three possible explanations for this lack of a CBRN
attack: disruption, deterrence and, most disturbingly,
patience.
Disruption
An encouraging explanation is that al-Qaeda's efforts
have thus far been disrupted through a combination of
stepped-up counter-terrorist efforts after 9/11 and
possibly the simple luck enjoyed by government
authorities. Clearly, the al-Qaeda CBRN programs that
existed in Afghanistan under the Taliban were at least
temporarily disrupted by the 2001 U.S.-led invasion and
subsequent need to move to safer locales. According to
this explanation, al-Qaeda's CBRN programs have yet to
recover from this significant setback.
Several specific CBRN attack plots have apparently been
disrupted, although none advanced far beyond the initial
planning stages. In May 2002, Jose Padilla arrived in
the United States, reportedly planning a "dirty bomb"
attack, but never got much beyond the idea stage.
Similarly, Dhiren Barot (also known as Issa al-Hindi)
was arrested in the United Kingdom in 2004, carrying
relatively detailed plans for conducting a Radiological
Dispersal Device (RDD) attack, but had not yet acquired
the necessary materials [6]. Given that an RDD attack is
widely considered the CBRN attack most likely within
al-Qaeda's capabilities, these disruptions could be
especially significant.
Al-Qaeda's chemical and biological plots have not fared
much better. In 2003, UK police arrested a group of
Algerians with recipes and materials for creating ricin
and cyanide, although stories conflict about whether any
actual poisonous material was recovered (BBC, April 13,
2005). A 2004 chemical plot against multiple targets in
Jordan had apparently advanced to the point of acquiring
vehicles and materials, selecting targets and assigning
duties (al-Jazeera, May 2, 2004). It remains unclear
whether the materials recovered were for the manufacture
of conventional explosives or chemical gases [7].
At the same time as these arrests,
however, al-Qaeda succeeded in launching devastating
conventional attacks in Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia,
Indonesia, Jordan, Spain, the United Kingdom, Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, while al-Qaeda has suffered
some setbacks in its CBRN efforts, these disruptions
alone do not appear sufficient to have prevented
al-Qaeda from conducting a CBRN attack given its other
successful attacks.
Deterrence
Another possible explanation for al-Qaeda's apparent
restraint is the threat of massive retaliation. Although
an intriguing possibility, the complications of
deterrence theory may offer more questions than answers.
Al-Qaeda's initial rationale for pursuing CBRN weapons
was the desire to deter enemies such as the United
States from attacking the organization [8]. In 2001, bin
Laden specifically warned, "We have [chemical and
nuclear] weapons as a deterrent" (Dawn, November 10,
2001). While this particular strategy clearly failed
after the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda may still be
using its CBRN efforts as part of its deterrence
strategy [9].
Traditional deterrence theory indicates that terrorist
organizations are less susceptible to deterrence
strategies because they lack the defined territory that
can be held hostage to a retaliatory attack. Al-Qaeda's
strategy, however, has long been to acquire just such
territory. In his book Knights Under the Prophet's
Banner, Ayman al-Zawahiri described this goal when he
wrote, "Confronting the enemies of Islam and launching
jihad against them require a Muslim authority,
established on a Muslim land." Al-Qaeda is no doubt
aware of the risks of acquiring territory. Previous
efforts to establish al-Qaeda authority in Sudan,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan and Iraq have all
resulted in U.S. attacks. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is an
organization that requires territory to operate and
carry out its mission and is clearly willing to accept
this risk to achieve its stated goals.
Today, al-Qaeda is heavily dependent on its safe haven
in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This dependency may
have driven al-Qaeda to compromise its immediate desire
to launch CBRN attacks against the United States for the
longer-term goal of establishing their authority in a
Muslim land as a stepping stone to future attacks and
ultimate victory. In particular, al-Qaeda may assess
that a significant CBRN attack against the West (or, for
that matter, another major attack on the U.S. homeland)
would invite a U.S. invasion of the tribal areas. The
Pakistani government—always staking a position somewhere
between Washington's and al-Qaeda's interests—may have
even warned al-Qaeda's leadership that such an attack
will lead to U.S. troops on Pakistani soil (with or
without Islamabad's consent) and the subsequent end of
al-Qaeda's safe haven. The U.S. occupations of
Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention the presence of
thousands of U.S. troops across the border in
Afghanistan, make the threat of an American invasion
more than credible.
Of course, al-Qaeda is not the only
combatant being deterred in this war. In fact, the
United States and al-Qaeda appear to have settled into a
pattern of violence acceptable to both sides. While
al-Qaeda continues to launch terrorist attacks around
the world, the terrorist organization appears to be
deterred from launching another major attack on the U.S.
homeland or a significant CBRN attack against U.S.
interests by the threat of a U.S. invasion of Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the United States occasionally launches
missile strikes against al-Qaeda targets on Pakistani
territory, but is reportedly deterred from sending
ground troops into Pakistan due to the possibility that
the Musharraf government would fall and an even more
dangerous Islamic terrorist threat would rise from the
ashes. Al-Qaeda may very well assess that a CBRN attack
would upset this delicate balance.
Patience
A final possibility is that al-Qaeda simply is waiting
for the right time to launch a CBRN attack. Bin Laden
has often been described as an exceedingly patient man,
willing to wait for the right moment to act. Major
terrorist attacks such as 9/11 were in the works for
years before the final order was given. Al-Qaeda's
leaders reportedly view their struggle against the
United States as a long one, likely to continue well
after they have left this world. In this view, the
attacks on September 11 were only one battle and the
final destruction of the United States may take
generations to complete.
Under this scenario, al-Qaeda is building its
capabilities in anticipation of a great victory and will
not rush to act just for the sake of acting. The planned
attack on the New York City subway system with the "mubtakkar"
improvised chemical device may be an example of such
patience. Al-Zawahiri reportedly called off the attack
because it was not an adequate follow-up to September 11
[10]. Al-Qaeda apparently wanted an even more
devastating attack for its second wave. Given the
carnage of 9/11, it is hard to imagine al-Qaeda wreaking
even more havoc, but a CBRN attack—including the
physical, psychological and economic impacts—could
certainly fit the bill.
It is possible that al-Qaeda's success with the
September 11 attacks has set the bar too high for its
current CBRN capabilities. Al-Qaeda may be concerned
that a CBRN attack that "only" kills dozens of people
would be perceived as a relative failure and demonstrate
its weakened position relative to its pre-9/11 stature.
The organization may prefer to wait until its CBRN
capability has matured to the point where its chances of
success are greater and its capability for destruction
has increased [11]. Given the fact that there is no
indication that al-Qaeda has abandoned its pursuit of
CBRN weapons, the possibility of a patient al-Qaeda is a
disturbing possibility worth remembering.
Conclusion
Many of the traditional reasons why terrorist groups do
not attempt CBRN attacks do not exist for al-Qaeda. The
organization has clearly demonstrated its willingness to
engage in indiscriminate killing on a massive scale
without fear of losing the support of its followers.
Al-Qaeda has also shown it is willing to take on the
technical challenges involved and has had some successes
in developing lethal materials including cyanide,
anthrax and especially the mubtakkar device.
Unfortunately, this combination of continuing interest,
growing capability and demonstrated patience may one day
pay off for al-Qaeda.
Chris Quillen is a former analyst in the
Counter-Terrorist Center at the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Notes
1. Interview with Jamal Isma'il, December 1998 and
re-broadcast on al-Jazeera, September 2001.
2. Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, "A Treatise on the
Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction
Against Infidels," May 2003.
3. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is
Losing the War on Terror, p. 155-156.
4. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, Testimony before the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York, United
States vs. Usama bin Laden et al, February 2001.
5. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Final Report, March 31, 2005, p. 269-270.
6. See, in particular, Dhiren Barot, "Final
Presentation," posted by the London Metropolitan Police
Service at http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/index.htm.
7. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 26, 2004. Al-Hayat, April
16, 2004. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi admitted to planning a
conventional bomb attack, but called the allegations of
a chemical plot "fabrications" in an audio statement
posted on the al-Ansar Forum, April 29, 2004.
8. According to Abu Walid al-Masri in his book The Story
of the Afghan Arabs: From the Entry to Afghanistan to
the Final Exodus with Taliban, published in al-Sharq al-Awsat,
December 8, 2004. See also Robert Wesley, "Al-Qaeda's
WMD Strategy Prior to the U.S. Intervention in
Afghanistan," Terrorism Monitor, October 7, 2005 and
Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal
Capability?: Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction,"
Nonproliferation Review, Volume 12, Number 3, November
2005, p. 625-626.
9. For another discussion of al-Qaeda's deterrence
strategy, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Can al-Qaeda Be Deterred
from Using Nuclear Weapons?" Occasional Paper 3, Center
for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 2005.
10. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside
America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11, p. 218-220.
11. See also Dunn, p. 15 "The fact that no single attack
has yet occurred may simply indicate that preparations
for a more spectacular multi-attack effort are under
way."
From:
www.jamestown.org
